Thursday, 11 April 2013

Demise of TV/Radio or Researchers Chasing a Story?

It seems that every week or two a new study shouts out on Twitter or social media declaring that the traditional ways of consuming TV and radio are being pushed aside and will soon be replaced by Wi-Fi TV, streaming smartphones, VOD, tablets, the second screen, etc.  Journalists faced with voracious editors lap this up and write about these sexy findings.   

Research results from the MTM (Media Technology Monitor) pop up in news stories on a regular basis. The MTM is conducted by two respected research firms in English and French Canada, marketed by BBM Analytics and accessed via a web portal designed and maintained by Forum Research. The funding is provided by a major broadcaster, although one has to have a keen eye to determine this.  It is not made clear who designs the study or writes the reports but we assume it is the sponsor.  One can purchase the results of MTM surveys at a steep discount, at a fraction of the original cost.  Or, you can visit the CRTC web site and get most of the MTM results for free or find most if not all the MTM trends in other sources, including Statistics Canada and BBM.  But if you want to know how many people in Alberta use game consoles versus an iPad to access Netflix, the MTM is for you. 

According to the MTM the majority of us are streaming audio, streaming video, watching Youtube regularly and presumably have little time left for anything else.  The MTM says in one place that 10% of us have Netflix, make that 12% in another place in the same report.  The MTM claims that 13% of Canadians subscribe to satellite radio but the sole satellite radio company says that its subscriber total is less than half that. However, the MTM didn't ask respondents if they personally had a Sirius/XM subscription and it is unclear if the MTM results are household or personal measures.  Respondents may have been confused and this may be why the MTM concludes that listening to podcasts is already on the decline, which seems counterintuitive. Perhaps that also explains why the CRTC published MTM  technology penetration statistics for VOD, etc. until 2011 and became more selective last year.

And therein is the biggest issue that surveys like the MTM represent. Just how valid are MTM-type surveys; do they over-estimate the adoption of new technologies and their impact on traditional media?  Are they so confusing to respondents that trends can't be relied on?
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Let’s consider some research from CMRI’s annual surveys for comparative purposes.  CMRI has conducted research into the new technologies for the past 10 years; this includes VOD (Video-on-Demand) and PPV (Pay-Per-View).  CMRI’s Media Trends Survey, conducted by mail,  reveals that interest in and use of these new ways of consuming TV is not as important as the MTM suggests.  PPV, the oldest of these new ways of watching TV has only been used once a month or more by well under 10% of Anglophone Canadians (Francophones are similar) in ten consecutive surveys.  The vast majority of viewers say they rarely or never use PPV. It is not that the Media Trends Survey lacks for new technology—the percentage of respondents who have Netflix, smartphones, PVRs, etc. is in line with other industry estimates.

The same pattern is true of VOD.  In the past six surveys we have asked people about VOD and each year less than 10% of respondents indicated that they already use VOD and of those that do not, a large majority said that they were unlikely to do so.  As with PPV, there is no pattern of increased use.  


For the better part of the past century survey researchers have learned by trial and error and best practices have been documented in text books and journals.  In the 1995 Canadian Journal of Marketing Research I summarized much of what we had learned about surveys dealing with new media technologies (the "electronic highway" back then). Researchers face many of the same challenges today. 

Surveys that deal with new technology, such as the MTM, can over-estimate use of new media either because of sampling techniques which under-represent everyday persons (a common problem with online samples) or by structuring the interview and questionnaire in ways that encourage respondents to say they use the new technology. The MTM surveys appear to fall into the latter category.

The MTM survey is conducted by phone, is very detailed and would challenge many people, attempting to capture everything there is to know about old and new electronic media in one interview.  Research about new technologies is exceedingly difficult to do and is rarely done over the phone successfully. Phone surveys are excellent for testing response to and gauging atttiudes toward well-known products and services.  

The MTM questionnaire assumes that the respondent possesses a great deal of knowledge about new technologies, such as VOD, satellite radio, internet streaming, downloading, podcasting, etc.  Respondents are not given a description of VOD, HDTV, set-top boxes, podcasting, etc.  and many people are unfamiliar with such terms. Assuming knowledge about new technologies can make respondents feel poorly informed, not up-to-date, and, to meet the expectations of the interviewer, lead some to exaggerate how much they use new technologies.  The questionnaire also tips off that the broadcaster is the sponsor, which can create bias.   The current questionnaire is not available on the MTM web site but earlier versions were. 

The science in surveys consists of the sampling design and data analysis; the art in surveys lies in the interface with respondents and the design of the questionnaire. 

The 2011 survey results are from CMRI's Media Trends Survey conducted November-December 2011 among a representative national sample of approximately 900 Anglophone respondents aged 18-plus.  Margin of error +/-3.3%.  The Media Trends Survey has been conducted for ten consecutive years and has surveyed over 15,000 Canadians in total. In our analysis we usually only report Anglophone results.   Both Anglophones and Francophones have been surveyed in this period, using questionnaires in each respective language.  Francophones have been surveyed in 5 of the 10 years.  To compensate for poorer response rates among younger adults results are statistically weighted in keeping with industry standards.  It is the only survey to have measured media use and attitudes continuously over this decade. The Media Trends Survey is not sponsored by any one industry or affiliated with a media company.

Monday, 25 March 2013

Time Travel Possible on Canadian TV

The value of distant Canadian and U.S. TV stations to consumers and cable/satellite companies is an issue that Canadian broadcasters have grappled with since the introduction of cable TV in the 1950’s. In the early years distant signals primarily meant that consumers could have access to border U.S. stations from the same time zone and they could watch programs not available on Canadian stations.  Today these signals come from all over North America, from every time zone and this allows viewers to time travel or timeshift, something cable companies and Canadian broadcasters never imagined in the 1950’s or 60’s. 

Incidentally, time shifting is not permitted in the U.S. where consumers can have access to only one  affiliate for each network, their local station.  In Canada, viewers can have access to many different stations belonging to the same network.  Bell TV, for example, offers viewers 25 different CBC TV stations. It is said that as much as one-third of all TV viewing of conventional broadcasters is time-shifted viewing.

Research evidence that demonstrates the value of distant signals for time shifting today can be found in CMRI’s Media Trends Survey, the only survey in Canada that has tracked usage and attitudes toward Canadian TV and other media over the past decade.  This annual survey is syndicated and purchased by a number of broadcasters and industry groups.

The Media Trends Survey has tracked the value of distant signals from other markets for timeshifting since 2003.  The following chart shows that the value of distant signals to consumers has remained constant over the past decade.  70% or more of respondents in nine consecutive years have agreed that TV stations from other time zones is one of the most valuable services offered by cable/satellite companies and in 2011 it reached an all time high, exceeding 80%:



The 2011 survey results are from CMRI's Media Trends Survey conducted November-December 2011 among a representative national sample of approximately 900 Anglophone respondents aged 18-plus.  Margin of error +/-3.3%.  The Media Trends Survey has been conducted for ten consecutive years and has surveyed over 15,000 Canadians in total. In our analysis we usually only report Anglophone results.   Both Anglophones and Francophones have been surveyed in this period, using questionnaires in each respective language.  Francophones have been surveyed in 5 of the 10 years.  To compensate for poorer response rates among younger adults results are statistically weighted in keeping with industry standards.  It is the only survey to have measured media use and attitudes continuously over this decade. The Media Trends Survey is not sponsored by any one industry or affiliated with a media company.

Tuesday, 12 March 2013

Satisfying Audiences: CBC vs. TVO

Say what you will about what's wrong with CBC TV in 2013.  Despite facing a more competitive environment, CBC TV has maintained its overall viewer satisfaction levels over the past decade.  Perhaps it is related to the fact that CBC TV has increased its budgets at the expense of CBC radio.  Or maybe because CBC TV programming, including news and public affairs, has chosen to reflect our interest in crime, celebrities and consumerism rather than information needs higher up the knowledge chain.  Whatever the reason, the Corporation's main TV service has kept viewer satisfaction levels steady for ten years running. 

Every year the annual Media Trends Survey has asked Canadians to tell us how satisfied they are with 100 or more different channels.  We only ask level of satisfaction for the channels people are aware of, since newer channels or regional channels are not on the same footing as national, established channels such as CBC or CTV.

The chart shows that the percentage of Canadians who say they are very satisfied with CBC TV has been stable over the past 10 years. In winter 2011-12 the very satisfied score was basically the same as in 2002.  Incidentally, many channels register satisfaction scores well below that of CBC and a handful have higher satisfaction levels.


For comparison purposes, the following chart tracks TVO satisfaction scores over the same ten year period.
 

Evidently, while CBC has been able to find a strategy to keep the average Canadian satisfied, TVO has struggled since about mid-decade.  Ten years ago TVO had satisfaction scores about equal to that of CBC but in recent years the level of satisfaction has trailed off and reached an all time low in winter 2011-12.  Some of this downtrend may be the result of the much smaller budget of TVO; and it cannot redirect funds from other services.  It may also be that in an industry that feeds on celebrity gossip, materialism, crime and violence, TVO has chosen to maintain a niche that focuses on more serious information needs.

The 2011 survey results are from CMRI's Media Trends Survey conducted November-2011 to January 2012 among a representative national sample of approximately 900 Anglophone respondents aged 18-plus.  Margin of error +/-3.3%.  The Media Trends Survey has been conducted for ten consecutive years and has surveyed over 15,000 Canadians in total. In our analysis we usually only report Anglophone results.   Both Anglophones and Francophones have been surveyed in this period, using questionnaires in each respective language.  Francophones have been surveyed in 5 of the 10 years.  To compensate for poorer response rates among younger adults results are statistically weighted in keeping with industry standards.  It is the only survey to have measured media use and attitudes continuously over this decade. The Media Trends Survey is not sponsored by any one industry or affiliated with a media company.

Tuesday, 12 February 2013

CBC's Self-inflicted Cuts to CBC Radio Now Over $50 million


The CBC president pronounced  at a CRTC hearing last November that CBC radio had been largely spared from the budget cuts made by the  federal government in spring 2012.  Here's what he said to the CRTC Commissioners: "when you look also at whether... the television side or the radio side that gets most of the cuts, we actually also protected the radio piece to the tune of -- about 84 percent of the cuts went on the television side, 16 percent of our cuts went on the radio side."  

CRTC implemented a new policy a while back that required all broadcasters, including CBC, to submit annual financial reports on their individual networks.  The CRTC financial reports are useful for understanding the revenues, expenses and staffing of CBC and other broadcasters.  The most recent report for the broadcast year ending August 31, 2012 contradicts what the president said at the CRTC hearing.

Here are some CBC English highlights in the CRTC financial data 2009-2012:

-The management has cut CBC English radio expenditures by some $54 million between 2009 and 2012 which is a 24% cut; total expenditures of the radio service were $171 million in 2012, less than one quarter  the cost of CBC English TV.  The $171 million represents a reduction of some $9 million from the previous year. CBC English TV was not only spared but actually increased expenditures to an all time high of $722 million in 2012, an increase of about $12 million over 2011.    



 -CBC salary expenditures followed suit, with CBC TV increasing and CBC radio decreasing.  Moreover, the number of staff employed by CBC TV increased to 3,199 in 2012, an increase of almost 200 over 2011.  The number of staff at CBC radio fell to 1,348 in 2012, almost 100 fewer than in 2011.  CBC French radio has seen its staff reduced similarly.

-CBC TV has increased its expenditures, as shown above.  However, CBC TV advertising revenue stalled in 2012.  CBC TV ad revenues totaled some $245 million in 2012, a million or so less than in 2011.  Ad revenues accounted for just 34% of the cost of CBC TV in 2012.  

The watering down of CBC radio, including the transformation of Radio 2 from a classical music and arts service to a miscellaneous music mix, the 50% reduction in midday local programming, the numerous same week repeats of network programs, the cancellations of talent contracts for theatre critics, etc., the long periods in summer when regular programs consist of nothing but repeats, the reductions in the depth of radio news and reporting, the focus on low hanging crime news, sports, weather and traffic, have presumably all been done for one over-riding reason: to save money, money which is being used to support the CBC's television service.  The question is: whom did CBC management consult to make these drastic cuts: CRTC, government, Canadians? 

Postscript:  There was no hint in CBC's 2012-13 Corporate Plan, presented annually to the government, that CBC ad revenues were flat.  In fact, the plan, which was issued in August 2012 and relates to the fiscal year rather than the broadcast year, stated:
"On the revenue front, CBC outperformed our target by 7 per cent, driven by incremental advertising revenue, largely from hockey playoffs, and a variety of other revenue items, such as program sales and facility rentals. Self-generated revenues continue to be an important source of funding for CBC."

 

Saturday, 8 December 2012

CBC 'Factortions' at CRTC Licence Renewal (Part Three)


At the recent CRTC licence renewal hearing CBC management distorted and contorted basic facts about staffing, salaries, schedule content and revenue models.  To be fair, CBC senior management is facing unprecedented financial challenges but  misconstruing basic facts will not yield a good result for the public broadcaster.  The licence renewal hearing brings into question the efficacy of the strategic planning process at the Corporation.  Below is the third and final factortion presented by the CBC:

Factortion:  Ad revenue for Radio 2/Espace Musique
CBC has requested approval to run commercials on two of its radio services.  The Commission’s decision may be viewed by future historians as a pivotal moment in Canadian public broadcasting. 

CBC engaged Strategic Inc. to forecast the potential revenue of commercials on Radio 2 and Espace Musique.  CAB in turn commissioned two research organizations to prepare estimates of the potential commercial revenue of the two radio services.  Friends of Canadian Broadcasting also asked CMRI to forecast revenues. During the last day of the hearing CBC’s research consultant was asked about the three competing forecasts and discounted them. The other forecasts all strongly suggested that CBC had under-estimated the revenue that would be realized from commercials on CBC radio. This was perhaps the key issue discussed at the hearing. 

The revenue model used by CBC’s research consultant is in all likelihood low-balling the potential revenue, although it is difficult to determine this because Strategic Inc. does not appear to have put its actual calculations on the public record.  The three competing approaches all showed exactly how they made their forecasts.  The limited information that has been filed by CBC contains serious errors, which are discussed below.  While it is tempting to dismiss this as simply “dueling researchers,” the Commission should study the various forecasts and determine which is more credible.

CMRI estimated potential commercial revenue using a well-recognized “top down” approach that employed revenue per tuning hour.  This model was criticized by the consultant because it was “theoretical.” The CBC’s research consultant also dismissed the other two analyses, which used a variation of the Strategic Inc. “bottom-up” approach.  Essentially, the research consultant claimed that all the competing forecasts were theoretical versus the bottom-up “practical” approach used by the CBC’s consultant. 

The consultant explained why she thought the practical approach was superior to the theoretical approach.  She explained the differences in the competing forecasts by virtue of the fact she had “customized” her forecast market by market. In its filing of April 20, 2012 the CBC said “Current audience shares would remain essentially the same” and the revenue projection “assumed…(s)ell out rates…by market” and “calculate(d) rates by station and by hour in the schedule.”  As mentioned, details of how this was done do not appear to be on the public record.  Strategic Inc. did not file a report of its analysis.  However, customization simply means the forecast is based on a greater number of assumptions.  The consultant had to make assumptions for several factors in a series of markets and therefore the CBC forecast has more risk than the market averages used by the CAB in its two forecasts.

CAB’s forecasts and that of Strategic Inc. all used a bottom-up, market by market approach. However, Strategic Inc. in a 2004 report[1], which was submitted to the Commission in a proceeding on local avails, explained the problems of the bottom-up approach: it “relies on several subjective factors” and “The challenges in this approach lie in the accuracy of its component parts and the fact that much of needed information is not publicly available or in an audited form.”

After reading the transcript it is unclear exactly what the consultant said was lacking in the CMRI approach, which used the average revenue/listening hour in private radio to forecast CBC’s potential revenue.  It is not surprising that the CBC’s research consultant had difficulty clearly enunciating weaknesses in the revenue per listening hour approach used by CMRI.  It is because she argued that it was a superior method when Strategic Inc. filed the above research with the CRTC on behalf of CTV in 2004.

Here is what Strategic Inc. said to the Commission in 2004 about the approach used by CMRI: it is “a better approach” than the bottom-up approach and “Using a “revenue per hour of viewing” model recognizes the critical role audience achievement plays and is based on the actual tuning…. In this approach to valuation, factors that affect the ability to generate revenues are built into the model, such as varying demands across markets and sell out rates.”

The last sentence in the quote summarizes the strengths of the approach used by CMRI and explains why the CMRI forecast differs from the bottom-up, practical approach used by Strategic Inc.  The revenue per hour of tuning method requires fewer assumptions, i.e., factors that affect tuning levels, sell out rates, market-by-market demand and seasonal variation are “built into the model” and can be empirically verified.   

After reading the transcript of what the CBC’s consultant said on the final day of the hearing, CMRI examined the data she referred to in more detail. On August 13, 2012 (Appendix C) CBC put limited information about its revenue forecast on the public record, at the Commission’s request.  That document and the one CBC filed on April 20th contained the projected revenues by station and in total for the two radio services.  The August 13th document showed sell out rates by market and projected audience shares, which on the first day of the hearing CBC’s consultant said were used to make the forecast.  In year one sell out rates ranged from about 9% to over 40%, without explanation.  Many markets showed substantially higher sell out rates in the later years but projected revenue did not follow suit.

Most importantly, in that August 13th filing the CBC’s projected audience shares, which determine revenue, for each CBC station were significantly at odds with the published BBM data sourced by CBC in cities such as Montreal, Ottawa, Windsor and Quebec City. In other words, there were errors in the CBC forecast.  For example, Radio 2’s share in Anglo Montreal was shown in the CBC forecast at 1%, when it has been about 2.5% for the past few years. In Windsor the CBC forecast put Radio 2’s share at 0.004%, when it has been about 1% (250 times higher than the number used in the forecast).  In all cases where there were errors, the audience shares were lower than published BBM data sourced by CBC and this would have had a very substantial negative effect on the revenue forecast.  BBM only publishes select markets, so there may be other discrepancies. In addition, on April 20, 2012, not only did CBC say that “current audience shares would remain essentially the same (as today)” but CBC said about its forecast that “projection of audience growth has been minimal as both services are approaching maturity.”  Yet, the CBC August 13th filing (Appendix C) showed 5 of 14 of Radio 2 stations more than doubling audience share a few years later, presumably also errors in the forecast.   These errors should invalidate the CBC/Strategic Inc. revenue forecast.

The bottom line: this is not a case of “he said, she said” but a case of “she said, and then she said.”  Strategic Inc. has previously strongly endorsed the top-down revenue/tuning hour approach in a very similar if not identical situation.  Strategic Inc. used it in the 2004-05 CRTC proceeding and referred to it as the best of three different approaches.

Both the facts and history have been contorted. The top-down revenue per listening hour approach has previously been accepted by the Commission and by Strategic Inc.  In this proceeding CBC has used a “subjective” approach, to use the words of Strategic Inc.’s 2004 report, and it should be considered potentially flawed and capable of manipulation.  In fact, a detailed examination of the information CBC filed about the forecast reveals that it is seriously flawed and rife with errors.  Three competing forecasts that fully explained their calculations strongly suggest that CBC has low-balled the potential revenue from radio advertising.

Understanding and incorporating basic and complete facts about the broadcasting environment is critical in strategic planning. The CRTC has an important role to play in helping the CBC understand this environment.  If such serious factual errors and misunderstandings, which have shaped CBC's current strategy, are not challenged by the CRTC, the errors, repeated often enough, will become conventional wisdom and Canadians will be left with a CBC that will not serve their needs.




[1] “Impact Analysis
Addition of Commercial Inventory on US Services carried on Cable,” Strategic Inc., October 4, 2004

 








Friday, 7 December 2012

CBC 'Factortions' at CRTC Licence Renewal (Part Two)

CBC’s current management is facing enormous challenges, greater than at any time in the Corporation’s history; the temptation to distort and contort the facts to suit a chosen, seemingly compelling, strategic direction is understandable.  However, the CBC's appearance at its recent CRTC licence renewal hearing brings into question the efficacy of the strategic planning process at the Corporation.  Understanding and incorporating basic and complete facts about the broadcasting environment is critical in strategic planning and CBC's disdain for the facts will not serve it well.  Here is the second of three serious factortions CBC made at the hearing: 

Factortion:  CBC TV Sports Programs

During the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting November 23, 2012, appearance before the Commission at the CBC's licence renewal hearing Ian Morrison made the interesting point that in the 8 months of the year when CBC TV carries NHL hockey (i.e., October to May) there are about 1,000 hours of prime time available (4 hours/night X 30 days X 8 months).  Mr. Morrison made the observation that professional sports or related programming accounts for about 400 prime time hours during those eight months.  He said 400 hours represents 40% of CBC’s prime time in those eight months, something that Friends’ tens of thousands of supporters are concerned about.  Even if the number of hours is only 300, this is still 30% of the primetime schedule in the highest viewing months.

The last day of the hearing CBC contorted this information by wrongly claiming that the Friends had said there were 1,000 hours of prime time sports programming on CBC TV, adding that since there are about 1,500 hours of prime time per year (in 12 months),  this would mean CBC’s schedule would be two-thirds sports (1,000/1,500 hours per year).  If CBC management didn’t care enough to attend or monitor the hearing, they could have read the transcript to learn precisely what Mr. Morrison had said.   Instead, CBC dismissed this useful observation by Friends by contorting and distorting basic facts presented to the Commission. 

Moreover, CBC stated that only 10% of its 2012 schedule was amateur or professional sports programming.  CBC didn’t make it clear that this number was for the whole day, not prime time.  An examination of CBC’s program logs would reveal that the amount of professional sports alone exceeded 20% in prime time in 2012, over 90% of which was hockey-related and all broadcast in the eight months Mr. Morrison referenced.  CMRI urges the Commission to review the program logs of CBC and the CRTC public data on CBC expenditures in sports programming to help it determine if CBC is too reliant on sports.

Thursday, 6 December 2012

CBC 'Factortions' at CRTC Licence Renewal (Part One)

 
The CRTC has completed an arduous two week hearing process to renew CBC licences, having heard from CBC senior management and many Canadians.  CBC is Canada’s most important cultural organization and its management, facing the most challenging period in CBC’s history, must ensure that it has properly weighed all the facts about its own organization and the role it plays in the broadcasting system as a whole.  These final comments are in response to the information that CBC management provided on the final afternoon of the hearing and serve to underscore some deficiencies in strategic planning at CBC. 

The term “factortion,” or the contortion and distortion of facts, was used in the Toronto Star earlier this year to describe an ailment that has afflicted CBC management in the past.  In the final day of the hearing CBC presented three serious factortions, each of which related to central issues at the hearing and demonstrate that current management have failed to incorporate some basic facts about the current broadcasting environment in their strategy.  There were other questionable statements made by CBC during this process, the most flagrant being that it was once the only radio operator in Canada.  Here is the first of three factortions CBC made at it final appearnce before CRTC:  

Factortion:  CBC’s efficiency compared to the private sector

Several interveners from private radio urged the Commission to consider that private radio is more efficient than CBC radio, providing evidence in the form of staff numbers per station and average salaries.  Their point was that rather than commercialize its radio services CBC should become more efficient.  CBC’s response was to dismiss this by first pointing out that the CRTC salary data contained overtime, benefits, etc.  CBC implied that overtime or benefits explain the high CBC salaries.

More importantly, CBC said on the last day that it was a large company and a fairer comparison would be to examine CRTC salary data for large private radio companies.  This is a valid point. It is true that CBC radio, according to CRTC data, only pays about $10,000 more per annum per employee when compared to Astral, BCE, Rogers, Corus and Cogeco, the largest private radio companies.  In fact, the CRTC data show CBC radio in total had far fewer staff than private radio stations in 2011, which had four times as many employees.  CBC radio had approximately 2,500 employees, about two-thirds of them in English radio.  Yet, in TV, CRTC data reveal that CBC/Radio Canada had as many staff, about 6,000, as all private conventional TV combined in 2011.  More importantly, the data reveal that the Radio Canada television service had more employees than CBC English TV.  CBC referred the Commission to the CRTC staff data and so we examined it and confirmed this important discrepancy in CBC radio and TV staff levels, which indicates that CBC can find more efficiencies, having done so in radio.

There are many good reasons why CBC radio and TV have a large number of staff: you can’t create quality programs without people. However, when the above-mentioned analysis of CRTC staff and salary data was published in the Star earlier this year one recently retired CBC staffer added some perspective: “I hate to disabuse you but what you say was the average salary last year was about one-third of what I was paid….Actually, as you know, averages are just that. The average would include all the low paid copy clerks and junior technicians, of whom there are many, and all of the high paid talent and producers, of whom there are few. Fortunately for public consumption that helps to bring the average down.” 

Those low-paid CBC clerks and technicians work very hard for their money and are worth every cent, providing an invaluable service to many, if not most Canadians.  However, the CRTC staff and salary data also reveal that CBC total salary expenditures showed a large annual increase in 2011, despite budget cuts.  The increase paid by CBC in salaries last year was just under $50 million, according to the CRTC data the CBC referred to in its final appearance. This is more than twice the amount CBC says it would generate from commercials on radio.

Some areas of CBC, especially management, may be over-staffed and paid more than the rest of the industry.  More than 600 managers, according to CBC, are in a category that makes them eligible for bonuses; this number has grown exponentially in the last decade.  Salaries of on-air staff and those of senior producers may be overly generous compared to the rest of the industry and CBC could find efficiencies. The Commission should carefully examine the staffing data CBC referenced in its final appearance to determine if efficiencies are preferable to further commercialization of CBC services, namely Radio 2 and Espace Musique.